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Presidents and the Rhetoric of Recessions
Are presidents reticent during recessions?  Some research indicates that presidents make fewer
major and minor speeches when economic conditions worsen (Ragsdale 1984; Eshbaugh-Soha
2010).  We examine whether this holds true with major discretionary speeches utilizing
recessions as the indicator of poor economic conditions.  In addition, we also investigate the
subject matter of major discretionary speeches given during both economic expansions and
contractions.  Presidents potentially have an incentive during a recession to focus the attention of
the public away from economic concerns, where they have little command and control ability, to
foreign policy, where they do have more power to act unilaterally.  We find that presidents are
not reticent during recessions.  During recessions, fewer average months elapse between major
discretionary speeches than we find elapse during economic expansions.  Furthermore, while
presidents never talk about the economy at high rates overall, they do focus more than twice as
many major discretionary speeches on economic topics during recessions than they do during
expansions.  We also find no evidence that presidents attempt to ratchet up the rate at which they
discuss foreign policy during recessions in an attempt to divert attention from economic matters.
Presidents and the Rhetoric of Recessions
Are presidents reticent during recessions?  Perhaps for good reason, presidents may tread
carefully in making economic remarks during recessionary periods.  To present the situation as
too dire could negatively affect the public’s prospective economic view; yet, to sugar coat or
gloss over the situation may not give a president the leverage he needs with various actors (in
both the public and private sectors).  In fact, Ragsdale (1984) found evidence that presidents
make fewer major speeches when inflation and consumer prices worsen.  More recently,
Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) found evidence that presidents make fewer minor policy speeches when
the misery index (a combination of unemployment and inflation) increased.  But, does it hold that
presidents are reticent during identified economic recessions, a different, and perhaps more
meaningful, economic indicator when one considers discretionary major speechmaking? 
Furthermore, when a president does deliver a speech during a recession, perhaps he seeks to
change the subject by talking about non-economic issues, such as foreign policy.  After all,
presidents have few economic tools to affect the economy in the short term, but the public will
hold them responsible for the state of the economy regardless.  Presidents who face recessions on
their watch, therefore, might have an incentive to rhetorically emphasize issues in which they
have more short-term ability to exercise leadership, such as in the foreign policy realm.  We are
interested in the ways presidents rhetorically react during economic contractions.  In particular,
we examine the following:
1.  When confronting an economic recession, do presidents choose to make major
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discretionary speeches, or do they choose to remain silent? 
2.  If they choose to make discretionary speeches during recessions, do they address
economic policy/concerns?
3.  Do presidents, during recessions, seek to divert attention away from the economy by
focusing their speeches on foreign policy?
To answer these questions, we examine major discretionary speeches given by presidents from
November 1948 (the beginning of the first post-war economic contraction) and June 2009 (the
ending of the latest economic contraction).
We find that presidents actually are not reticent during recessions.  Fewer months elapse
between major discretionary speeches during recessions that during expansions.  They also
address economic concerns more during recessions than expansions, although they still prefer to
talk about foreign policy.  But, they focus on foreign policy at roughly the same rate as during an
expansion.  Thus, there is little evidence of a strategy of seeking to divert attention away from the
economy by ramping up the rate at which they address foreign policy.
Almost 50 years ago, Aaron Wildavsky (1966) first put forth the notion of the two
presidencies, where one presidency dealt with domestic matters and presidential influence was
constrained by Congress, while a more powerful presidency, less constrained by Congress, dealt
with foreign policy.  Over the years, there have been many assessments and reassessments of this
thesis, many of them finding evidence for skepticism about the idea (see many of these collected
in Shull 1991; Fleisher et al. 2000).  Most recently, however, new life was breathed into the
notion that presidents do have more influence in foreign policy (Binder 2003; Canes-Wrone,
Howell, and Lewis 2008).  Most of these studies, however, have dealt with presidential influence
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vis a vis Congress.  Lewis (1997) also applied the two presidencies notion to presidential
rhetoric, finding that when speaking on economic issues, presidents asked for support from the
public and Congress.  When speaking on foreign policy matters, however, the president did not
make such appeals.  Given the nature of presidential power, this finding intuitively makes sense. 
The president has certain constitutional powers that give him the prerogative to act in foreign
policy (Peterson 1994).  The public pays little attention to foreign policy until events bring media
attention to the topic (Wittkopf 1990).  Congress, as an institution, concerns itself mostly with
domestic policy, and the incidence of gridlock between Congress and the president is less for
foreign policy (Binder 2003, 52-53).  We also know that the act of giving a major speech can
boost presidential approval (Ragsdale 1984; Brace and Hinckley 1992; but also see Edwards
2003).  In addition, we also know that there exists an expectations gap; the public has unrealistic
expectations of what presidents can actually accomplish (Waterman, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva
1999).  The expectations gap can be exacerbated by campaign rhetoric, where presidential
hopefuls have an incentive to offer cures for all ills, while ignoring the reality of shared
congressional responsibility for policy making.  Recent presidents, especially, have begun
treating governing like campaigning, carrying over campaign tactics (especially rhetorical ones)
to the task of governing (Ornstein and Mann 2000; Edwards 2007).  Once elected, the president
may find the expectations gap especially acute in the area of economic policy, where the
president has little short term ability to affect the state of the overall economy, but is held
responsible for aspects of it, nonetheless (Sigelman and Knight 1985).  Conversely, the president
does have some foreign policy tools that he can exercise unilaterally, or with fewer constraints
from Congress.  Might this give a president, during economic recessions, an incentive to remain
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silent during bad times as some previous research supports?  After all, a president would not
want to increase expectations by potentially fostering the notion that economic problems were
tractable.  Or, it could be a situation in which a president seeks some potential short term
advantage with the public by seeking to focus their attention on something other than economic
conditions and policy?  Foreign policy is an obvious choice if one wants to project an aura of
being “presidential” due to the nature of roles such as head of state, commander in chief, and
chief diplomat.  In these areas, presidents can generally act more decisively, with dispatch, and
with less involvement of Congress.
Economic Contractions and Expansions
To examine these questions, we must first establish a time line for economic contractions
and expansions.  The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines an economic
contraction, or recession, as “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income,
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales” (NBER 2010).  During the time1
period under examination, there have been 11 recessions (Table 1).  We rely on the beginning
and ending months of economic contractions and expansions as determined by NBER and major
discretionary speeches are categorized as to whether they occur during a recessionary or
expansionary time period.  One potential problem with using the actual dates of a recessionary
period is that the dating of both the beginning and ending of economic contractions lags,
sometimes substantially.  For example, the most recent recession was judged to have begun in
NBER, a private, nonprofit research group, was formed in 1920 to further the study of1
economics and was particularly organized around the study of business cycles (Fabricant 1984). 
For the history of business cycles in the U.S., see NBER 2010.
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December 2007, but NBER did not announce this date until 12 months into the recession as
shown in Table 1.  If, however, one examines public perceptions and sentiment, using the
identified dates of recessions is much less problematic.  As Howrey (2001) illustrates, a decline
in the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) (based on five attitudinal
survey questions) and identified recessions track closely together (Howrey 2001, Figure 1, 180). 
Therefore, even though it takes NBER many months to pinpoint the starting month of a
contraction, consumer sentiment (tracked monthly) will begin to register a significant decline. 
Despite not being told a recession has officially begun, consumers “feel” it as tracked through the
ICS.  The same is true as the contraction ends; despite not being told of its ending by official
channels, consumer sentiment will register improvement.  Thus, as an administration is
considering whether a president should choose to make a major speech, they may not have a
determination from NBER as to whether the country is in the throes of a recession, but they
certainly do have reams of economic data and measures of public opinion, such as the influential
ICS (and many data analysts).  Presidents and their administrations are going to know, therefore,
when times are hard.  One question, then, becomes whether they want to acknowledge this in a
major speech.  Calculations about whether to make a major speech, and whether or not to focus it
on economic matters, thus are made with lots of information about economic conditions and
public opinion, even in the absence of NBER determinations.  Given that we need a firm time-
line of recessions and expansions in order to categorize speeches, we use the peak and trough
dates as determined by NBER.  We believe this indicator is a better measure of poor economic
conditions, than previous uses of separate economic indicators that capture short term
fluctuations (both positive and negative) within a recessionary period. 
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The workings of the business cycle are unpredictable in terms of when a contraction will
emerge and how long it will last, but as its nature is cyclical, we know that a recession will occur
following a peak of economic activity.  Most presidents will be unlucky enough to have
recessions occur on their watch (Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, GHW Bush,
GW Bush, and Obama); some are fortunate enough to serve only during economic expansions
(JFK, Johnson, and Clinton).  During recessions, presidents must react to economic events.  They
must carefully measure their reaction and speculate about what the public’s reaction may be. 
After all, the public’s perceptions and expectations about the economy affect their voting (Lewis-
Beck 1988; Lewis-Beck and Tien 1996), presidential approval (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson
1992), and their economic behavior (see Wood, Owens, and Durham 2005 for a review of this
literature).  There are any number of reactions to economic conditions a president may have, but
we are only concerned with his rhetorical reactions.  The president can choose to address the
public, or not.  Before choosing to make a major speech, any administration is going to weigh:1)
how presidential remarks may impact the economic behavior of consumers, and relatedly,
markets, 2) how remarks may impact presidential standing with the public, and 3) how
presidential remarks may affect any coming midterm or presidential election.  Given the potential
and varied effects, which are difficult to predict, the president may choose to remain silent. 
Thus, we arrive at our calculus of interest.  When Americans are confronting hard times, what do
presidents choose to do rhetorically?
Major Discretionary Speeches
We examine all major discretionary speeches given by presidents from November 1948 to
June 2009.  These dates are significant as November 1948 is the month the first post-war
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recession began; June 2009 is the month in which the most recent recession ended.  A
discretionary speech is one a president chooses to make.  This excludes such speeches as
inaugurals, State of the Union addresses, and farewell addresses where there is a general
expectation that a president will give these at particular points in time.  We use this as our criteria
because we are concerned with whether a choice is made to give a speech, and what kind of
speech is given (economic, foreign policy, or other).  Second, we isolate our examination to
major discretionary speeches; that is, speeches broadcast to a national audience during prime-
time hours.   These are high impact speeches crafted primarily to address the American public2
and have the largest potential viewing audiences.  Finally, once major discretionary speeches
were identified, we determine whether the speech had a substantial economic component, a
substantial foreign policy component, or whether a speech was on other or multiple subjects (See
Appendix 1 and 2).  In determining whether the content was “substantial,” we used the criterion
There is some disagreement over the nature of what constitutes a major speech (Kernell2
2007, 115, 144-45 n2-3).  Furthermore, as noted by Simon and Ostrom (1989, 65, n5), “there is
little consistency among” the various lists of televised presidential speeches.  Baum and Kernell
(1999) voice a similar concern, noting “frankly, we have found no completely reliable and
exhaustive listing of presidential appearances on network television.”  While Ragsdale (2009)
identifies major addresses (Table 4-1) and defines them as those “delivered to a national
audience during evening listening hours,” the table includes speeches that were, in fact, not
delivered during prime-time hours.  We have excluded any speeches from Ragsdale’s list that
were not given at, or after, 7 p.m. eastern time (or the equivalent).  In addition, we updated the
list to the present time.  Furthermore, we excluded speeches where other policy-makers also
delivered remarks (two Eisenhower speeches).  Lastly, we only included speeches that all three
major networks covered.  As a further precaution, we cross checked the various lists that exist
(Kernell 2007; Ragsdale 2009; Baum and Kernell 1999;  Simon and Ostrom 1989) with the
Public Papers of the Presidents (at the American Presidency Project http://presidency.ucsb.edu)
and the Vanderbilt Television News Archive (http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/).  With the checking
and cross-checking, we are reasonably sure that our list of major discretionary speeches
(Appendix 1) is complete.
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of at least half of the speech being devoted to either economic or foreign policy.    While most3
major discretionary speeches are primarily on a single subject matter, there are a few that span
more than one policy area.  For example, George H.W. Bush gave a speech on September 11,
1990 on both the Persian Gulf and the federal budget.  However, the majority of the speech deals
with happenings in the Persian Gulf, and only a minority of it deals with the budget; it, therefore,
was classified as a foreign policy speech.
During the time period under study, presidents have delivered 180 major discretionary
speeches (Table 2).  There is considerable stability from president to president in terms of the
months that typically elapse between discretionary speeches.  As others have noted (Kernell
2007), there are only so many major speeches a president can give.   Nixon averaged the fewest4
months between discretionary speeches; about two months typically separated.  This is
influenced by the number of events taking place during Nixon’s tenure (active foreign policy
agenda, Vietnam, and Watergate), which he chose to address with major discretionary speeches. 
Clinton had the most average months between speeches with 6.4 months typically elapsing. 
Finally, at the point in which the Great Recession of 2007-09 ended, Obama had only been in
office for five months; while he did deliver the equivalent of a State of the Union address in
February 2009 (and thus, not discretionary), he had not given a major, discretionary address by
the end of the recession in June 2009.  Given, however, that this was only the fifth full month of
Economic policy included anything related to the control of business cycles, fiscal3
policy, and monetary policy.  Foreign policy included issues of defense, diplomacy, and relations
with nations.  These categorizations were guided by Pomper 1980.
Using months in office as a predictor of the number of major discretionary speeches4
given by a president will explain 61% of the variance in number of speeches.
9
his term, this is not out of the ordinary.  During the period under study, an average of 4.4 months
elapsed between major discretionary speeches given by presidents.  Ragsdale’s similar measure
found an average of 3.3 months between discretionary speeches, but her study ended in 1980
(1984, 973).  One should note in Table 2 that three of the four presidents in office since 1981
have higher average months elapsing between speeches, influencing the overall mean and
accounting for the difference.  5
Recessionary Rhetoric
Do presidents make fewer major discretionary speeches during recessions? Previous
research determined that, “presidents, it seems, become less likely to make major public
addresses when economic bad times face their audiences” (Ragsdale 1984, 977). Ragsdale,
however, measured bad times by unemployment and consumer prices.  We determined above6
that during our time period, one could expect, on average, a major discretionary speech every 4.4
months.  If one considers the months of recession in our time period (122) as consecutive, and
the number of months of expansion (594) as consecutive, then we arrive at a rough measure of
determining whether the rates of speeches are similar or dissimilar in these two categories.  There
are 42 discretionary speeches given during recessions (see Appendix 1). Thus, there is an average
of one discretionary speech every 2.9 months during recessionary months.  There are 138
discretionary speeches given during expansions (see Appendix 2).  During expansions, presidents
As Baum and Kernell (1999) note, the “golden age of presidential television” was5
affected by the rise of cable outlets and both presidents and networks reacted by becoming more
strategic.
A similar finding, using minor discretionary policy speeches and the misery index (a6
combination of inflation and unemployment), was found by Eshbaugh-Soha (2010); presidents
made fewer minor speeches during bad economic times. 
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average one speech every 4.3 months.  Thus, on this measure,  presidents tend to actually choose
to talk MORE during recessions than expansions, when one considers the months consecutively.
We can also consider recessionary months non-consecutively.  Table 3 shows, given the
length of each recession and the overall rate of one discretionary speech every 4.4 months, what
we would expect in terms of the number of speeches made during each recessionary period.  This
is then compared to the number of actual speeches given during the recession.  We would expect
a total of 27.7 speeches to be given over the course of the 11 recessions, and there are actually 42
speeches that are given.  In addition, if one examines each recession, there are only four instances
in which the actual number of speeches falls below expectations for that recession.  In two of
these instances (1960-61; 2007-09), the recession encompasses a presidential election and
transition period with an outgoing, lame-duck Republican president, and an incoming
Democratic president.  The 1980 recession also falls slightly below expectations, but it is also the
shortest recession during our period of study (six months) and occurs as the 1980 presidential
campaign is taking place.   Thus, in three of the four recessions where we see fewer speeches7
than expected, there is a presidential campaign and/or election taking place.  It would seem, then,
that if a campaign/election is intervening,  presidents tend to be a little more reticent than
expected during the recession.  In addition, as Baum and Kernell (1999) note, networks seem to
be skeptical of giving prime network time to lame-ducks.  Overall, however, when treating
recessions as separate entities, we also find that presidents tend to talk MORE during recessions;
in seven of eleven recessions, presidents are exceeding the number of speeches one would
In addition, since it is impossible to give 0.4 of a speech, if one were to round the7
expected number of speeches to make this meaningful in the context of the unit of analysis
(speech), 1980 would not classify as being below the expectation.  
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normally expect.  Thus on two measures, one treating recessionary months consecutively, and
another treating recessions non-consecutively, we find that presidents aren’t reticent at all during
recessions.  In fact, they give discretionary major speeches at a higher rate than they do overall.  
We are also interested in what subjects presidents choose to address when they decide to
take to the airwaves.  As noted above, if half or more of a speech was about economic matters,
we judged it to have a substantial economic component; if half or more of a speech was about
foreign policy, it was judged to have substantial foreign policy content.  These determinations
can be found in Appendix 1 and 2.  A majority of major discretionary speeches during our time
period are foreign policy speeches; fully 56% of all speeches contain substantial foreign policy
content.  Only 19% of all major discretionary speeches had substantial economic content.  In
general, presidents do not focus many discretionary speeches on economic content; they are
much more likely to choose to take to the airwaves and address foreign policy matters.  Since
these speeches are speeches of choice, do presidents choose different content depending on
whether the country is in a recession or in an expansion?
To test this proposition, we utilize a chi-square test of independence to establish if there
is a relationship between two nominal variables.   Is there an association between the economic8
condition and the content of speeches?  Our first hypothesis is that economic content of a speech
is associated with the economic condition; Table 4 presents the results.  The chi-square statistic
is significant, thus we can reject the null that there is no association between the two variables. 
Phi indicates, however, that the relationship is relatively weak.  Furthermore, knowing the
For the utility of using tests of significance on population data, see Blalock 1979 and8
Rubin 1985.
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economic condition reduces our proportion in making an error of predicting economic content of
a speech by only 6%.  Note above that we saw economic speeches being somewhat uncommon
during our time period.  We would expect there to be 8 speeches during recessions that had
substantial economic content; we had, however, 15 speeches with economic content.  Finally, a
speech with economic content is more than twice as likely to appear in a recession than in an
expansion.
Our second hypothesis is that the foreign policy content of a speech is associated with the
economic condition.  As shown in Table 5, the chi-square statistic is not significant, thus we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between these variables.  Presidents
are just as likely to give a foreign policy speech during an expansion, as during a recession.
Thus, we find that presidents, under any economic condition, are not that prone to making
speeches that are substantially about the economy; only 19% of discretionary major speeches
meet this criterion.  However, when the economy has been in recession, 36% of the discretionary
speeches given have been about the economy; during expansions, only 14% contained substantial
economic content.  Thus, not only do presidents tend to talk more frequently under recessionary
conditions (by averaging fewer months between speeches during recessions), but they are also
more than twice as likely during recessions to focus their content on economic matters than they
are during expansions.  Presidents do not, however, seek to change the subject to foreign policy
during recessions.  While they give more foreign policy speeches during recessions, the same is
true during expansions.  Their choice to give a foreign policy speech bears no association with
the economic condition.  Presidents, regardless of economic condition, prefer to wear the foreign
policy hat in major discretionary speeches.  But, when the economic situation deteriorates, they
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do step up the rate of economic speeches. While we have examined under what economic
conditions presidents are choosing to make major discretionary speeches, future research needs
to examine more specifically what presidents are choosing to say in recessionary economic
speeches.
The “bully pulpit” has developed as a leadership tool for presidents.  Yet, whether or not
presidents have an ability to unilaterally change policy or solve highly complex and inter-related
economic problems is not something about which the public has a good understanding.  What the
public does have, however, is a conception of our government as seemingly presidency-centered
and a corresponding expectation that the president exercise leadership and solve the problems
facing the country.  This conception is due, in part, to the rhetorical powers that have developed
in the presidency (Tulis 1987).  These expectations on the part of the public are something from
which the president cannot escape.  As a result, it is important to examine the conditions under
which presidents exercise their rhetorical power, especially in regard to major speeches of choice
and the topics they choose to address.  We now know that they do rhetorically react to recessions
by not becoming reticent, but by slightly increasing the rate at which they address the public.  In
addition, they choose to address economic topics at significantly higher rates than during
expansions.  In addition, they do not ratchet up the rate at which they talk about foreign policy
during recessions in an attempt to divert attention, although foreign policy is always the most
popular subject to address, regardless of economic condition.
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Appendix 1: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Contractions
Substantial
Dates of Contraction president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
11/1948 - 10/1949 Truman/ July 13, 1949 National Economy Yes No
7/1953 - 5/1954 Eisenhower/ July 26, 1953 Korean Armistice No Yes
Eisenhower/ Aug 6, 1953 Achievements No No
Eisenhower/ Jan 4, 1954 Purposes & Accomplishments No No9
Eisenhower/ March 15, 1954 Tax program Yes No
Eisenhower/ April 5, 1954 Goals & Problems No No
8/1957 - 4/ 1958 Eisenhower/ Sept 24, 1957 Little Rock Desegregation No No
Eisenhower/ Nov 7, 1957 National Security No Yes
Eisenhower/ Nov 13, 1957 National Security No Yes
4/1960 - 2/1961 Eisenhower/ May 25, 1960 Events in Paris No Yes
12/1969 - 11/ 1970 Nixon/Jan 26, 1970 Veto of Approp. Bill Yes No
Nixon/ April 20, 1970 Vietnam No Yes
Nixon/ April 30, 1970 Cambodia No Yes
Nixon/ June 3, 1970 Cambodia No Yes
Nixon/ Oct 7, 1970 Vietnam No Yes
11/1973 - 3/1975 Nixon/ Nov 7, 1973 Energy shortage No No
Nixon/ Nov 25, 1973 Energy policy No No
Nixon/ Apr 29, 1974 Watergate tapes No No
Nixon/ July 3, 1974 Soviet Union No Yes
Nixon/ July 25, 1974 Economy Yes No
Ford/ Aug 12, 1974 Jt. Session address Yes No
Ford/Oct 15, 1974 Remarks to FFA Yes No
Precursor to State of the Union Address to be given three days later9
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Appendix 1: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Contractions (con’t)
Substantial
Dates of Contraction president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
Ford/ Jan 13, 1975 Energy & Economy Yes No
Ford/ March 29, 1975 Signing of Tax Bill Yes No
1/1980 - 7/1980 Carter/ Jan 4, 1980 Afghanistan No Yes
7/1981 - 11/1982 Reagan/ July 27, 1981 Tax policy Yes No
Reagan/ Sept 24, 1981 Economy Yes No
Reagan/ Dec 23, 1981 Christmas and Poland No Yes
Reagan/ April 29, 1982 Budget Yes No
Reagan/ Aug 16, 1982 Budget Yes No
Reagan/ Sept 1, 1982 Middle East No Yes
Reagan/ Oct 13, 1982 Economy Yes No
Reagan/ Nov 22, 1982 Foreign Policy No Yes
7/1990 - 3/1991 Bush/ Sept 11, 1990 Persian Gulf & Budget No Yes
Bush/ Oct 2, 1990 Budget Yes No
Bush/ Jan 16, 1991 Persian Gulf No Yes
Bush/ Feb 23, 1991 Persian Gulf No Yes
Bush/ March 6, 1991 Persian Gulf No Yes
3/2001 - 11/ 2001 Bush, GW/Aug 9, 2001 Stem cell research No No
Bush, GW/ Sept 11, 2001 Terrorist attacks No No
Bush, GW/ Sept 20, 2001 Terrorist attacks No Yes
12/2007 - 6/2009 Bush, GW/ Sept 24, 2008 Economy Yes No
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Appendix 2: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Expansions
Substantial
Dates of Expansion president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
11/1949 - 6/1953 Truman/July 19, 1950 Korean War No Yes
Truman/Sept 1, 1950 Korean War No Yes
Truman/Sept 9, 1950 Defense Production Act signing Yes No
Truman/Dec 15, 1950 Korea (nat’l emergency) No Yes
Truman/Apr 11, 1951 Korea and US Policy in Far East No Yes
Truman/June 14, 1951 Inflation controls Yes No
Truman/Nov 7, 1951 Arms reduction No Yes
Truman/Mar 6, 1952 Mutual security No Yes
Truman/Apr 8, 1952 Steel Mills No No
Eisenhower/May 19, 1953 National Security costs Yes No
6/1954 - 7/1957 Eisenhower/Aug 23, 1954 Achievements of 83  Cong No Nord
Eisenhower/July 15, 1955 Geneva Conference No Yes
Eisenhower/July 25, 1955 Geneva Conference No Yes
Eisenhower/Feb 29, 1956 Decision on 2  Term No Nond
Eisenhower/Apr 16, 1956 Farm bill veto No No
Eisenhower/Oct 31, 1956 Middle East/E. Europe No Yes
Eisenhower/Jan 5, 1957 Middle East No Yes
Eisenhower/Feb 20, 1957 Middle East/UN No Yes
Eisenhower/May 14, 1957 Govt costs Yes No
Eisenhower/May 21, 1957 Mutual security No Yes
5/1958 - 3/1960 Eisenhower/ March 16, 1959 Security in Free World No Yes
Eisenhower/Aug 6, 1959 Labor bill needed No No
Eisenhower/Sept 10, 1959 European trip No Yes
Eisenhower/Dec 3, 1959 Goodwill trip No Yes
Eisenhower/Feb 21, 1960 Departure for South America No Yes
Eisenhower/Mar 8, 1960 Return from South America No Yes
3/1961 - 11/1969 Kennedy/June 6, 1961 Return from Europe No Yes
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Appendix 2: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Expansions (con’t)
Substantial
Dates of Expansion president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
Kennedy/July 25, 1961 Berlin crisis No Yes
Kennedy/Mar 2, 1962 Nuclear testing & disarmament No Yes
Kennedy/Aug 13, 1962 Nat’l economy Yes No
Kennedy/Sept 30, 1962 Univ. of Mississippi situation No No
Kennedy/Oct 22, 1962 Cuban missile crisis No Yes
Kennedy/May 12, 1963 Birmingham situation No No
Kennedy/June 11, 1963 Civil rights No No
Kennedy/July 26, 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty No Yes
Kennedy/Sept 18, 1963 Test Ban Treaty and Tax Reduction Yes No
Johnson/Apr 9, 1964 Railroad labor dispute No No
Johnson/Aug 4, 1964 Gulf of Tonkin No Yes
Johnson/Oct 18, 1964 Events in Russia, China, Great Britain No Yes
Johnson/Mar 15, 1965 The American Promise No No
Johnson/Apr 7, 1965 Peace without Conquest (Vietnam) No Yes
Johnson/Apr 28, 1965 Dominican Republic No Yes
Johnson/May 2, 1965 Dominican Republic No Yes
Johnson/Aug 30, 1965 Steel industry No No
Johnson/Jul 24, 1967 Detroit riot No No
Johnson/Jul 27, 1967 Civil disorder No No
Johnson/Mar 31, 1968 Vietnam/will not run No Yes
Johnson/June 5, 1968 Robert Kennedy  No No
Johnson/Oct 31, 1968 Bombing halt No Yes
Nixon/May 14, 1969 Vietnam No Yes
Nixon/Aug 8, 1969 Domestic policy No No
Nixon/Nov 3, 1969 Vietnam No Yes
 
12/1970 - 10/1973 Nixon/Apr 7, 1971 Vietnam No Yes
Nixon/July 15, 1971 China invitation No Yes
Nixon/Aug 15, 1971 Economic policy Yes No
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Appendix 2: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Expansions (con’t)
Substantial
Dates of Expansion president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
Nixon/Oct 7, 1971 Economic stabilization Yes No
Nixon/Oct 21, 1971 Nomination of Powell and Rehnquist No No
Nixon/Jan 25, 1972 Peace plan No Yes
Nixon/Feb 28, 1972 Return from China No Yes
Nixon/Mar 16, 1972 Busing No No
Nixon/Apr 26, 1972 Vietnam No Yes
Nixon/May 8, 1972 Vietnam No Yes
Nixon/June 1, 1972 Return from USSR No Yes
Nixon/Jan 23, 1973 Paris peace accord No Yes
Nixon/Mar 29, 1973 Vietnam and domestic probs No Yes
Nixon/Apr 30, 1973 Watergate No No
Nixon/June 13, 1973 Price controls Yes No
Nixon/Aug 15, 1973 Watergate No No
Nixon/Oct 12, 1973 Ford as VP No No
4/1975 - 12/1979 Ford/Apr 10, 1975 Foreign policy No Yes
Ford/May 27, 1975 Energy programs No No
Carter/Feb 2, 1977 Report to American people No No
Carter/Apr 18, 1977 Energy plan No No
Carter/Apr 20, 1977 Energy plan No No
Carter/Nov 8, 1977 Energy plan No No
Carter/Feb 1, 1978 Panama Canal treaties No Yes
Carter/Sept 18, 1978 Camp David No Yes
Carter/Oct 24, 1978 Anti-inflation program Yes No
Carter/Dec 15, 1978 Diplomatic Relations with China No Yes
Carter/Apr 5, 1979 Energy policy No No
Carter/June 18, 1979 Report on Vienna Summit No Yes
Carter/July 15, 1979 National goals No No
Carter/Oct 1, 1979 Peace & National Security No Yes
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Appendix 2: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Expansions (con’t)
Substantial
Dates of Expansion president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
8/1980 - 6/1981 Reagan/Feb 5, 1981 Economy Yes No
Reagan/Apr 28, 1981 Economy Yes No
12/1982 - 6/1990 Reagan/Mar 23, 1983 Nat’l security No Yes
Reagan/Apr 27, 1983 Central America No Yes
Reagan/Sept 5, 1983 Soviets/Korean Airline No Yes
Reagan/Oct 27, 1983 Lebanon, Grenada No Yes
Reagan/May 9, 1984 Central America No Yes
Reagan/Apr 24, 1985 Budget/deficit reduction Yes No
Reagan/May 28, 1985 Tax reform Yes No
Reagan/Nov 14, 1985 Geneva summit No Yes
Reagan/Nov 21, 1985 Geneva summit No Yes
Reagan/Feb 26, 1986 Nat’l security No Yes
Reagan/Mar 16, 1986 Nicaragua No Yes
Reagan/Apr 14, 1986 Libyan air strike No Yes
Reagan/July 4, 1986 Independence Day No No
Reagan/Sept 14, 1986 Drug abuse No No
Reagan/Oct 13, 1986 Meeting with Gorbachev No Yes
Reagan/Nov 13, 1986 Iran-Contra No Yes
Reagan/Mar 4, 1987 Iran-Contra No Yes
Reagan/June 15, 1987 Venice summit, arms control, deficit Yes No
Reagan/Aug 12, 1987 Iran-Contra No Yes
Reagan/Dec 10, 1987 USSR Summit No Yes
Bush/Sept 5, 1989 Drug Control Strategy No No
Bush/Nov 22, 1989 Thanksgiving address No Yes
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Appendix 2: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Expansions (con’t)
Substantial
Dates of Expansion president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
4/1991 - 2/2001 Bush/Sept 27, 1991 Nuclear weapons reduction No Yes
Bush/May 1, 1992 LA riots No No
Bush/ Sept 1, 1992 Hurricane Andrew No No
Clinton/Feb 15, 1993 Economic program Yes No
Clinton/Jun 26, 1993 Iraq No Yes
Clinton/Aug 3, 1993 Economic program Yes No
Clinton/Sept 22, 1993 Health care reform No No
Clinton/Sept 15, 1994 Haiti No Yes
Clinton/Sept 18, 1994 Haiti No Yes
Clinton/Oct 10, 1994 Iraq No Yes
Clinton/Dec 15, 1994 Middle class bill of rights Yes No
Clinton/June 13, 1995 Budget plan Yes No
Clinton/Nov 27, 1995 Bosnia No Yes
Clinton/Aug 17, 1998 Grand Jury/Lewinsky No No
Clinton/Dec 16, 1998 Military strikes in Iraq No Yes
Clinton/Dec 19, 1998 End of military strikes in Iraq No Yes
Clinton/Mar 24, 1999 Air strikes on Serbian targets No Yes
Clinton/June 10, 1999 Agreement on Kosovo No Yes
12/2001 - 11/2007 Bush, GW/June 6, 2002 Homeland Security Department No No
Bush, GW/Mar 17, 2003 Iraq No Yes
Bush, GW/Mar 19, 2003 Iraq No Yes
Bush, GW/May 1, 2003 Iraq (on USS Abraham Lincoln) No Yes
Bush, GW/Sept 7, 2003 War on terror No Yes
Bush, GW/June 28, 2005 Iraq No Yes
Bush, GW/July 19, 2005 Nomination of John Roberts No No
Bush, GW/Sept 15, 2005 Hurricane Katrina No No
Bush, GW/Dec 18, 2005 Iraq/War on terror No Yes
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Appendix 2: Major Discretionary Speeches Given During Economic Expansions (con’t)
Substantial
Dates of Expansion president/date of speech subject Substantial Foreign Policy
Economic Component? Component?
Bush, GW/May 15, 2006 Immigration reform No No
Bush, GW/Sept 11, 2006 Anniversary of terrorist attacks No Yes
Bush, GW/Jan 10, 2007 War on terror in Iraq No Yes
Bush, GW/Sept 13, 2007 War on terror in Iraq No Yes
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Table 1:  Post-War Economic Contractions (Recessions)
Beginning Ending Peak Announced (lag in months) Trough Announced (lag in months)        Length (months)
Nov 1948 Oct 1949                                                 11
July 1953 May 1954                                                 10
Aug 1957 Apr 1958                                       8
Apr 1960 Feb 1961                                     10
Dec 1969 Nov 1970                                     11
Nov 1973 Mar 1975                                     16
Jan 1980 Jul 1980 June 3, 1980 (6) July 8, 1981 (12)                                              6
Jul 1981 Nov 1982 Jan 6, 1982 (7) July 8, 1983 (9)                                     16
Jul 1990 Mar 1991 April 25, 1991 (10) Dec 22, 1992 (10)                                       8
Mar 2001 Nov 2001 Nov 26, 2001 (9) July 17, 2003 (21)                                       8
Dec 2007 June 2009 Dec 1, 2008 (12) Sept 20, 2010 (16)                                     18          
Source: NBER, Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, www.nber.org/cycles.html (accessed May 2011)
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Table 2.  Major Discretionary Speeches, 1948-2009 











Bush, GW 17 5.6
Obama   0 na11




Table 3:  Expectation of Discretionary Speeches (recession months considered non-consecutively)
Beginning Ending Length (months) Expected Actual
# of Speeches # of Speeches
Nov 1948 Oct 1949 11 2.5 1
July 1953 May 1954 10 2.3 5
Aug 1957 Apr 1958   8 1.8 3
Apr 1960 Feb 1961 10 2.3 1
Dec 1969 Nov 1970 11 2.5 5
Nov 1973 Mar 1975 16 3.6 9
Jan 1980 Jul 1980   6 1.4 1
Jul 1981 Nov 1982 16 3.6 8
Jul 1990 Mar 1991   8 1.8 5
Mar 2001 Nov 2001   8 1.8 3
Dec 2007 June 2009 18          4.1 1
          27.7           42
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Content?                    
No 119 27
(86.2%) (64.3%)
Yes   19 15
(13.8%) (35.7%)
Total 138 42
×  = 10.12 (p<.001)2
Phi = .24 (p<.001) Goodman and Kruskal’s tau = .06 (p<.05)




Policy Content?      
No   56 24
(40.6%) (57.1%)
Yes   82 18
(59.4%) (42.9%)
Total 138 42
×  = 3.58 (n.s.)2
Phi = -.14 (n.s.) Goodman and Kruskal’s tau = .02 (n.s.)
